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Taylor has responded to critiques of his soft perennialism model in relationship to what he 
has called awakening experiences. The fact that some individuals have this type of experience 
away from the context of religion or spirituality, according to soft perennialism, is explained 
by a sort of landscape of experience representing the diverse ways in which one may engage 
with and experience this essential beingness. While this inspiring vision could possibly 
be true, so also could numerous other speculations about ultimate reality; however, the 
evidence advanced in support of soft perennialism notion is not valid in the context of 
psychology, or of any scientific endeavor. Taylor's claims that his metaphysical schema is 
at least partly evidence-based appears to stem from an overly philosophical view of science 
and a misunderstanding of the nature of valid scientific evidence. As such, soft perennialism 
is not a psychological theory, but functions more as a New Age spiritual vision. Given 
that perennialist visions such as Wilber's have received long and careful scrutiny within 
the transpersonal field, and now play a reduced role, a sober assessment is that perennialist 
models belong more to the field's past than to its future. At the same time, Taylor's empirical 
research into a particular type of developmental transformation may contribute importantly.
Glenn Hartelius
California Institute of Integral Studies 
San Francisco, CA, USA
Keywords: soft perennialism, philosophy of science, metaphysics, valid evidence
Taylor’s Soft Perennialism:
Psychology or New Age Spiritual Vision?
Taylor’s (2016) paper on soft perennialism and my response (Hartelius, 2016a), both published in this journal, have generated several 
subsequent papers in a back and forth dialogue. My 
two prior responses (Hartelius, 2017a, 2017b) have 
addressed issues in perennialism more broadly; here 
these arguments will be applied directly to Taylor’s work 
and his prior responses. This will necessarily entail some 
restatement of ideas expressed elsewhere. 
 A central point of concern with Taylor’s (2016, 
2017a, 2017b) position is his claim that his speculative 
metaphysical philosophy of spirituality is at least partially 
based on empirical evidence, and is empirically testable. 
Taylor has affirmed the importance of grounding 
and testing theories in scientific evidence, which is 
commendable among perennialist theorists. At the same 
time, the evidence advanced for his soft perennialism 
is not scientifically valid, but consists of speculative 
extrapolation supported by inadequate strategies such 
as circular reasoning. The worthy intention of creating 
a broadly inclusive philosophy of spirituality that is 
grounded in science and lived experience falls short 
as other perennialist models have, due to a wholesale 
absence of valid evidence. This is the central and likely 
fatal weakness of soft perennialism as a psychological 
theory, one that renders other considerations moot.
 Before engaging in the specifics of dialogue, 
it may be useful to step back and paraphrase Taylor’s 
claims, as well as consider them in a psychology context. 
According to Taylor (2016), there are many varieties 
of spiritual experience, and some of these types of 
experience may occur outside of religious contexts. For 
example, he has claimed there is empirical evidence that 
what he has called awakening experiences can occur in 
entirely ordinary settings, experiences in which there is 
an intensification of awareness; a decreased sense of one’s 
separate self and an increased sense of connectedness 
and union; enhanced inner stillness and equanimity; 
movement toward empathy, compassion, and altruism; 
a decrease in a sense of personal agency; and increased 
wellbeing (Taylor, 2016). 
 These awakening experiences can be explained 
as a shift from the conventional experiences of mundane 
life toward an experience that is more aligned with 
“the radiant, blissful nature of our deepest being” 
(Taylor, 2017c, p. 218), which constitutes an underlying 
https://doi.org/10.24972/ijts.2017.36.2.136
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psychological or experiential realm (Taylor, 2016). 
Spiritual experiences, of course, occur in a variety of 
forms—a fact that in Taylor’s view cannot be explained 
either by neurobiology, cultural transmission, or 
conventional perennialist models that posit an objective 
transcendent spiritual dimension or goal. This diversity 
can, in his view, be explained as different ways of 
engaging with this radiant, all-pervasive spiritual force 
that is one’s very own nature, and that can be felt as 
such. This, for Taylor, is the actual source of all spiritual 
experiences in all traditions, and it functions as a sort 
of landscape of potential spiritual experiences and goals. 
Though this force is immanent rather than ultimate, it 
may be perceived as ultimate in some traditions.
 There have no doubt been tens of thousands 
of individual spiritual communities across humanity 
and throughout time, each with a slightly or greatly 
different spiritual practice or spiritual goal. Taylor’s 
(2016) approach implies that his account has uncovered 
the actual domain that is the essence of oneself, and that 
all of these varied traditions have encountered. While he 
has acknowledged that there are many different ways to 
engage with this essence, his position necessarily implies 
that the manner in which spiritual traditions understand 
and represent this all-pervading spirit-force is accurate to 
the degree their accounts align with his, and distorted 
to the degree that they diverge—even if he himself is 
tolerant of such divergences. 
 Yet for Taylor, this account is not only spiritually 
accurate, it is also scientifically accurate, and deserving 
of inclusion in psychology. This requires a fundamental 
and far-reaching revision of science and psychology to 
allow for the inclusion of large metaphysical claims, which 
Taylor trivializes on the basis that science itself necessarily 
implies some approximating assumptions of the nature of 
reality. Metaphysical claims such as Taylor’s should, he 
has argued, be accepted if they are “inferred or implied 
by phenomenological evidence and with more research 
proposed to test a hypothesis” (Taylor, 2017b, p. 111).
 The soft perennialist idea Taylor has advanced 
offers an inspiring spiritual vision. The sources of Taylor’s 
model appear to stem from his own spiritual experiences 
beginning in his teenage years (Taylor, 2010), comparison 
of his experiences with metaphysically-inclined scholars 
of mysticism such as Eliade, Happold, Hoffman, Levy-
Bruhl, Murti, Schuon, Smith, Spencer, Stace, Suzuki, 
Underhill, and Wilber (Taylor, 2016; it is noted that 
he does not always agree with the positions of these 
scholars), and qualitative interviews with individuals 
who have had experiences that are resonant with his own 
(e.g., Taylor, 2012). His views appear to have taken shape 
over a period of years (cf. Taylor, 2005), and now seem 
fairly well developed. 
 While much of his approach is problematic 
within psychology, Taylor’s personal experiences, his 
process of coming to a spiritual understanding of reality 
that is likely shaped by these, and his desire to share 
this vision with others, is entirely consistent with the 
development of a spiritual teacher. In the contemporary 
world, as science and psychology have in many ways 
gained ascendency over religion, it is not uncommon for 
some who function as spiritual teachers to position their 
work not so much as spiritual, but as a contribution to 
psychology (e.g., Blackstone, 2006; Wilber, 2000). 
 While a transpersonal approach strives for 
the inclusion of various aspects of the whole person 
that go beyond behavior, cognition, social relations, 
and neural activity, the incorporation of religious 
and metaphysical claims is not the province of any 
psychology, transpersonal or otherwise. Spiritual 
teachers should be warmly appreciated and encouraged 
to continue their important work outside of the context 
of psychology, or else to participate in psychology as 
psychology, rather than attempting to reformulate the 
discipline to accommodate their teachings. Efforts to 
insert religiously-toned doctrines into psychology should 
be firmly rejected.
 This overview provides context for specific 
responses to Taylor on topics such as the nature of 
science, the limits of evidence, and the boundaries of 
psychology.
Taylor and the Nature of Science 
A common refrain in transpersonal circles is that contemporary science is inadequately informed by 
philosophy. This leads to the automatic incorporation of 
reality assumptions from Western philosophy, such as 
atomistic materialism—the world is made of tiny discrete 
particles of matter—and Cartesianism—subjective 
experience is somehow a different kind of reality than 
matter. This has nevertheless proven to be a productive 
approximation of reality, and one can point to a great deal 
of empirical work that has produced results consistent with 
these assumptions. At the same time, this set of assumptions 
might not be equally effective for all phenomena, 
particularly those associated with living systems. 
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 Taylor's view of science, on the other hand, may 
be philosophically overinformed to a degree that makes 
it incommensurable with the practical discipline. For 
example, he wishes to allow metaphysical claims within 
science, and to include metaphysical systems such as 
perennialism within psychology. In support of this he has 
argued that metaphysics are not merely present within 
science in a limited and unavoidable way, but pervasive 
within the discipline so that the reality assumptions 
typical of science stand on equal footing with those that 
inform his soft perennialism (Taylor, 2017a). Yet given 
that the philosophical assumptions present in science were 
sufficiently accurate within technological applications 
that the Space Shuttle program was able to build and 
successfully fly huge vehicles into Earth orbit and back, 
it seems awkward to claim that these assumptions are on 
par with a claim that spiritual experience of every kind 
derives from an all-pervasive spiritual force (Taylor, 2016). 
This latter claim not only is untestable in scientifically 
valid ways, but is merely one of numerous quite different 
accounts of ultimate reality offered just within perennialist 
thought (Hartelius, 2017b). 
 As noted, Taylor’s concerns about science are not 
unfounded, and even Maslow held a critical stance toward 
some aspects of science. However, such critiques need to 
be made in the context of respect for the contributions 
of science and recognition of its continued ubiquity. 
Otherwise, like the anarchist who boards a city bus and 
travels down government-built streets to attend a rally in 
a publicly-maintained square, the critique outgrows any 
constructive role and approaches a horizon of absurdity. 
What can be observed with confidence is that Taylor’s 
view of science is either absent from or an exceedingly 
small minority position within any scientific field. 
     Taylor (2017b) has argued that “There is 
no reason why transpersonal psychologists should 
refrain from stating metaphysical positions, so long 
as these are secondary, and are inferred or implied by 
phenomenological evidence and with more research 
proposed to test a hypothesis” (p. 116). It can be noted 
that metaphysical positions are not testable hypotheses, 
because metaphysics are by definition untestable; further, 
while Taylor may personally infer his soft perennialism 
from experiential reports, the data do not naturally imply 
any such schema. There is no prohibition within science 
or psychology regarding the naming or discussion of 
metaphysical concepts, but theories that only work if 
certain far-reaching untestable metaphysical speculations 
are assumed to be true generally fail at winning even 
cursory consideration. This is not some idiosyncratic 
notion invented by either Friedman (e.g., 2002, 2015) 
or myself, but rather a pragmatic fact of how scientific 
fields function. There is no suggestion that the implicit 
philosophy of science should be accepted uncritically; on 
the other hand, the presence of critique does not open 
the door to wholesale disregard for rigorous thought 
regarding the role and limits of metaphysics.
 If transpersonal psychologists aspire mainly 
to form a Thursday night theosophical dinner club 
where one can wax eloquent on metaphysical theories 
of spirituality, then I heartily agree with Taylor that the 
field should embrace metaphysics of all kinds. On the 
other hand, if scholars in the transpersonal field wish 
to be part of the discipline of psychology, as the name 
implies, then this is an excellent reason to refrain from 
advancing metaphysical speculations as explanations of 
psychological experiences. 
Taylor and the Limits of Evidence
Taylor (2017b) has asserted that his metaphysical claims are justified because they are suggested by 
his phenomenological data. Yet any number of different 
metaphysical theories could be extrapolated from a given 
set of phenomenological reports (cf. Hartelius, 2017a); the 
fact that Taylor has allegedly discovered evidence within 
such reports for his preexisting beliefs (e.g., Taylor, 2005, 
2010), and has provided no evidence of bracketing these 
beliefs (identifying them and deliberately setting them 
aside), suggests that his positive findings may be at least in 
part the result of a robust confirmation bias. Metaphysical 
claims are metaphysical precisely because they cannot 
be validly tested by any means, phenomenological or 
otherwise; phenomenological results are not generalizable 
and are never used to test an hypothesis. 
 Taylor (2017b) has also asserted that perennialist 
claims are testable in other ways:
It may not be valid to assume that the evidence 
for perennialism or essentialism cannot be tested, 
and is not publicly accessible. It can be tested, and 
is accessible to investigation, through engagement 
with the spiritual practices that have given rise to 
cross-cultural mystical experiences with common 
characteristics. It may therefore be unreasonable to 
exclude essentialism from transpersonal psychology 
(and psychology in general). In these terms, 
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 139Psychology or  New Age Spiritual Vision?
perennialism does not necessarily lie outside science 
and psychology, and soft perennialism should not 
be seen as a New Age religion (as Hartelius has 
suggested). (p. 111)
This optimistic assessment is, unfortunately, 
entirely inaccurate, and it would seem that Taylor holds 
a rather atypical notion of what constitutes evidence in 
the setting of psychology or any other scientific field of 
study. A believer in a religion may, through adherence to 
certain practices and by means of encounter with certain 
experiences, come to a personal conviction that their 
path is the true path; but since individuals come to such 
convictions within a great number of different paths and 
practices, this fact can hardly be equated with scientific 
evidence. Absent some other valid form of evidence, 
reports of such experiences do not give credence to the 
belief systems that are constructed out of them. 
Perennialism and essentialism are both claims 
of privileged knowledge about the nature of reality. 
Perennialism, of whatever type, asserts that some 
particular dimension or realm or experience is the one 
true source of all spiritual experience, or goal of all 
spiritual striving, and that all traditions with differing 
views are in error to the degree they diverge from this 
one correct understanding. Essentialism claims to know 
which property of a phenomenon is more real than all the 
others. Neither of these claims is demonstrable by means 
of evidence that are scientifically valid. Perennialist 
systems are essentialist spiritual visions, not psychological 
theories; as such, they might be studied for their value in 
providing inspiring meaning frames for individuals, just 
as with any other religious system. They should not be 
advanced as psychological theories.
 In contrast to this, Taylor (2017b) seems 
confident that he has laid out “ample evidence for a 
common core of essential characteristics of awakening 
experiences (as explorations and interpretations of 
the same expansive landscape of potential human 
experience)” (p. 111). On this basis, he asserts that “an 
experiential perennialist (or essentialist) outlook is valid 
and necessary” (p. ). What Taylor has laid out, both 
here and elsewhere, such as in his reference to Hood’s 
M-Scale, is not more than preliminary evidence that a 
particular type of developmental transformation may 
exist. It is not a valid defense of any perennialist position.
 Though Taylor’s studies to date may be imperfect 
(Hartelius, 2016a), there does appear to be some 
preliminary evidence suggesting that a particular type of 
beneficial psychological transformation, consistent with 
some accounts of spiritual transformation, may occur 
outside the context of any spiritual practice or religious 
belief. If confirmed by further and more careful study, 
this would be of great importance for transpersonal 
psychology and for the study of spirituality generally. 
However, evidence that this type of transformation 
occurs is not evidence for Taylor’s associated metaphysical 
speculations. 
 This question of evidence seems crucial in the 
dialogue with Taylor, for if criteria for valid evidence 
cannot be agreed on, then he will continue to claim that 
he has made an evidence-based case, and I will maintain 
that he has not. For example, Taylor's (2017a) assertion 
that a metaphysical claim could be partly evidence-
based was compared with literalist Christian claims that 
Noah’s flood can be partially supported by geological 
evidence; also, the assertion by some that the religious 
idea of intelligent design is scientific was used to illustrate 
how a lens shaped by preexisting metaphysical beliefs 
can affect the interpretation of data (Hartelius, 2017a). 
Taylor (2017b) has objected to these illustrations as false 
equivalencies or post-truth positions, yet appears to miss 
the critical point. The issue is not, for example, that “soft 
perennialism is similar to intelligent design because both 
are partly evidence-based” (p. 118), but rather, as with 
intelligent design, soft perennialism is based on no valid 
evidence whatsoever. Nor is the issue that “creationism 
is based on the willful misinterpretation and fabrication 
of evidence” (p. 118); rather, as with some creationists, 
Taylor appears to hold a sincere conviction and then seek 
confirmatory evidence in ways that lack validity.  
 As discussed at length elsewhere (Hartelius, 
2017b), the use of similarities between different 
traditions as evidence for perennialism or essentialism 
is a form of circular reasoning rather than a form 
of valid evidence. Phenomenological evidence from 
reports of lived experience is in the same category as 
evidence from traditions, because traditional accounts 
are simply formalized and interpreted versions of 
the same sort of reports. Moreover, evidence for the 
existence of a particular type of experience or process 
of development—whether from traditional accounts, 
qualitative research, or even quantitative studies—is not 
evidence for a speculative metaphysical explanation of that 
phenomenon. 
 For example, a Native American myth tells the 
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story of two tribes, one diligent and one lazy (Clausen, 
1954), similar in moral to Aesop's fable of the industrious 
ant and the dissolute grasshopper. In the end, the Great 
Spirit gives wings to the hard-working tribe and they 
become bees who fly from flower to flower sipping nectar; 
the members of the lazy tribe also receive wings, but are 
made into flies who have to eat discarded food. Empirical 
observations can confirm that bees feed from flowers and 
flies eat garbage, but this does not in any way provide 
evidence for the veracity of an imaginative explanation of 
why this is so. 
 In a parallel way, the evidence that Taylor has 
advanced for a particular type of experience is not valid 
evidence for his inspiring but highly speculative soft 
perennialist explanation of that experience. Even if Taylor’s 
evidence for such experiences were impeccable—even if 
he were to have flawless cross-cultural phenomenological 
comparisons—this evidence regarding the existence of a 
type of experience would not translate into evidence for 
a soft perennialist explanation; because there is a logical 
gap between where the evidence applies, and where Taylor 
wishes it to apply, the evidence itself becomes irrelevant. 
 By way of analogy, if several pieces of compelling 
circumstantial evidence have tied a suspect to a murder, 
but the suspect has a strong alibi—for example, if the 
chief of police and the mayor and her husband all testified 
that the suspect was having a beer with them at the time 
the murder was committed—then the circumstantial 
evidence would not even be considered, no matter how 
powerful it might otherwise seem; the ironclad alibi has 
created a gap between the evidence and its applicability 
to the (former) suspect. In a similar way, there is no need 
to consider the specifics of what Taylor has advanced as 
evidence for soft perennialism, given that the alleged 
evidence does not apply.
 There is an additional logical problem with 
Taylor’s argument that because there are no satisfactory 
alternate explanations, then his explanation must be 
correct. This is a fallacy, because it could be that all 
currently available explanations, including Taylor’s, 
are wrong. It certainly is not necessary, for example, 
to have a fully adequate neurobiological theory of the 
experiences Taylor (2017b) has described in order to set 
aside speculative perennialist explanations. Of course, the 
opposite is also true: it is possible that what people feel in 
such experiences is the radiant presence of being itself. 
The purpose of this extended critique is not to claim that 
Taylor’s vision is wrong, but to point out that as with any 
other metaphysical schema, there is no valid evidence to 
make a determination either way. 
 Another concern raised by Taylor (2017b) is that I 
have failed to take into account evidence for perennialism 
from other contemporary scholars. He specifically 
mentions Studstill (2005) and Rose (2016) who “have 
made extremely detailed comparative investigations of 
contemplative traditions” (Taylor, 2017b, p. 112). As 
noted, using comparative investigations as evidence for 
perennialism constitutes circular reasoning; since such 
similarities are grounds for the premise, they cannot 
also be used as evidence for the conclusion. Nor is it a 
responding author’s responsibility to address evidence 
for perennialism that Taylor has not articulated within 
the dialogue. Nevertheless, I have reviewed Studstill’s 
(2005) mystical pluralism for evidence of perennialism, 
and shown that he has brought forward no valid evidence 
(Hartelius, 2017b); however, a comparison of Wilber, 
Taylor, and Studstill has been fruitful, yielding seven 
characteristics of a perennialist New Age religion that 
may be useful for analyses of other such schemas. 
 Taylor also critiques specific wording relating 
to my concerns that he may have prematurely dismissed 
potential neuroscientific explanations for similarities in 
the category of experiences under study. He has pointed 
out, correctly, that he rejected neuroscientific factors as 
explanations, as potentially reductionist (Taylor, 2017b), 
whereas I defended possible correlations with neurological 
activity. Of course, correlations are generally the basis for 
explanations, and Taylor (2017a) specifically pointed to 
“the lack of direct and reliable correspondence between 
mental and neural activity” (p. 112); this does sound a lot 
like skepticism that any correlations exist between mind 
and brain. Taylor has helpfully clarified that he does not 
rule out the possibility of correlations between neural 
activity and the experiences he describes, so there may be 
agreement on that point. 
 A difference between my stance and Taylor’s, 
relative to neuroscience, seems to be that he has already 
confidently arrived at an explanation. This position 
is also evident in his proposal of the term, awakening 
experiences, which happens to be compatible with his 
own metaphysical speculations regarding this type of 
experience (Taylor, 2010): that such transformations are 
an awakening to a profound truth of the essence of being, 
of which he has gained a revelation. This is consistent 
with the exceptional confidence in his account of the 
actual source of spiritual experience, and in his vision 
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of how science and psychology and the rules of scholarly 
evidence must bend to accommodate this truth. 
Taylor and the Boundaries of Psychology
Taylor’s concern that transpersonal experiences be studied effectively seems quite genuine. Yet retaining 
scientific rigor will not necessarily preclude meaningful 
psychological understandings of mystical, spiritual, and 
other exceptional human experiences that constitute 
what Maslow (1969) called “the farther reaches of human 
nature” (p. 1). Taylor (2017b) has warned that if such 
topics are marginalized as metaphysical and thereby 
describe quantum events. Furthermore, the physicists who 
developed quantum mechanics in the early 1900s, and 
who participated in these debates during its first decades, 
uniformly thought of quantum events as objective, 
physical occurrences (Friere, 2003). The controversy 
arose from efforts to express the observations of quantum 
mechanics “in common language, suitably refined by 
the vocabulary of classical physics” (Bohr, 1961, p. 26), a 
project supported by physicists such as Schrödinger and de 
Broglie, but resisted by others such as Heisenberg, Born, 
and Jordan (Jähnert, 2012). The Solvay V conference was 
convened in 1927, in part, to resolve this issue within the 
community of physicists, but largely failed in this respect 
(Bacciagaluppi & Valentini, 2009).
  For decades after this conference, the debate 
about interpretations “was considered by physicists 
at the time as a philosophical controversy, and thus 
as a controversy without implications for physics” 
(Friere, 2003, p. 575); it was not until 1964, when Bell 
challenged “Von Neumann’s proof against the possibility 
of introducing new variables in quantum theory. ... [This 
opened] the possibility of including experimental physics 
in order to reject some theories and preserve others” 
(p. 577). While quantum physicists have engaged in 
conversations that involve metaphysical speculation, it 
is evident that they have also held a clear demarcation 
between philosophy and science. 
 The example that Taylor (2017b) has offered 
concerns a record of Bohr’s comments to Heisenberg and 
Pauli in which he complained about the unwillingness 
of logical positivists to even have a conversation about 
metaphysics. Yet one does not find that any of these 
eminent physicists included overt metaphysical claims 
in their quantum theories. There is a considerable gap 
between discussing philosophy and metaphysics as such, 
and inserting these as assumptions into, for example, a 
psychological theory. If one were to follow the example 
of quantum physicists, it would be prudent to separate 
speculative philosophies of spirituality from explanatory 
models in psychology. 
 Also on this topic, Taylor (2017b) charges that I 
have not acknowledged “the inevitability of holding some 
kind of interpretative metaphysical position in relation 
to mystical experiences … because mystical experiences 
often bring a powerful sense of revelation, a sense that 
one has made contact with a deeper level of reality, … 
such experiences inevitably give rise to questions about 
the nature of reality” (p. ). He then questions why I have 
excluded from psychology, this would be contrary to the 
history and principles of the transpersonal field. Here 
I stand in full agreement with Taylor, as well as with 
Maslow (1970), who considered these to be naturalistic 
phenomena that could be studied empirically. There is 
no suggestion here that these are metaphysical, nor any 
attempt to exclude them. To the contrary, there is critique 
of metaphysical explanations for such events that shortcut 
the more difficult process of careful and suitably designed 
scientific inquiry.
 Taylor (2017b) has also raised the issue 
of quantum physics as justification for the use of 
metaphysical ideas in science. This is a welcome addition 
to the discussion, since the application of quantum 
theory to psychology has created considerable muddle. 
Quantum mechanics rests on a set of equations that 
predict, with great reliability, the likelihood of various 
outcomes from events that occur at scales smaller than 
an atom. All efforts to explain these equations and the 
events they predict in the language of everyday human 
experience are necessarily speculative interpretations, 
including the famed Copenhagen interpretation 
developed by Bohr and Heisenberg—though there 
is scarcely any agreement on what this interpretation 
actually is (Camilleri, 2009), and even Bohr and 
Heisenberg held significantly different views of the 
interpretation they had jointly sponsored (Mehra, 1975). 
The success of this interpretation among a confusion of 
competing ideas at the Solvay V conference in 1927 may 
have been due as much to political maneuvering as to 
any conceptual superiority (Bacciagaluppi & Valentini, 
2009). Deep disagreements about interpretations of 
quantum mechanics continue to the present day (Friere, 
2003). 
 It is worth noting that there has been relatively 
less dispute about the mathematical equations that 
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not declared my own metaphysical assumptions, and 
notes that my suggestion that perhaps “consciousness in 
some form penetrates through all physicality” (Hartelius, 
2015, p. 26) constitutes a metaphysical claim. 
 There are several issues here. First, as Taylor 
(2017b) himself has acknowledged, I have noted that 
some metaphysical assumptions are unavoidable, 
even in science. This necessarily applies to the study 
of mystical experiences as well. But Taylor is speaking 
of something more here, of the conviction that arrives 
with a mystical experience, the sense that something 
previously unknown about reality has been revealed. I 
have had such experiences as well, and can attest to their 
power and the questions they raise concerning the nature 
of reality. A logical positivist would likely dismiss such 
experiences out of hand; Taylor, conversely, appears to 
have allowed the convictions inspired by such experiences 
to supersede rational analysis. Since he has inquired, my 
approach is to hold both the rational analysis and the 
mystical encounter as parts of the whole of what it is to 
be human, to give each its due within its own domain 
of experience, and to reach for a more inclusive way of 
understanding that allows for both without violating or 
diminishing either. This is an aspirational position, since 
I do not claim to have succeeded.
 As for the suggestion that consciousness might 
penetrate physicality, I entertain this as a possible 
alternate to the assumption that physicality has no 
consciousness. The latter is one of the philosophical 
assumptions that usually accompanies scientific work. 
It is not controversial to claim that consciousness 
occurs in human beings, though the term remains 
difficult to define. What is challenging to explain is how 
consciousness comes to be present in humans in a world 
that, according to science, is made of rule-following 
particles. There are quite a few different theories on this 
issue in philosophy of mind, but whichever one is chosen 
will inescapably be metaphysical. Therefore, some notion 
of rudimentary consciousness as an aspect of matter may 
be as true as its opposite. Acknowledging this would not 
change experimental standards or reduce scientific rigor, 
but would allow some research to proceed rather than 
be dismissed a priori. However, I frankly acknowledge 
that the notion of consciousness permeating matter as an 
aspect of what it is, is just as unavoidably metaphysical as 
the countervailing notion of naïve materialism. 
 How does this differ from Taylor’s (2016) soft 
perennialism and his suggested all-pervading spirit-
force? For one thing, some account of consciousness 
is an accepted fact of psychology, while all-pervading 
spirit-force is not. For another, consciousness is essential 
to the description of the mind, while a palpable spirit-
force is not. The presence or absence of consciousness 
in a person is clearly observable: it is present in waking 
states, dormant in sleep, perhaps immobilized under 
anesthesia, and departed in death. The presence of an all-
pervading spirit-force requires not only a particular type 
of experience, but a very particular interpretation of that 
experience, and a carefully customized interpretation of 
selective reports from multiple traditions. Finally, the 
study of consciousness is a difficult undertaking that 
needs to hold its assumptions lightly and its theories 
tentatively. This differs from Taylor’s study of experiences 
that allegedly awaken one to the all-pervading spirit-
force, a stance that may reflect more confidence than is 
warranted.
 In this regard, it can be noted that Taylor (2017b) 
has rejected the critique that his soft perennialism is also 
hierarchical. Because it claims that an all-pervading 
spirit-force is the source of all spiritual experience, then 
those traditions with teachings that are more aligned 
with this description are necessarily more accurate than 
those that do not (Hartelius, 2017a; note that Ferrer 
[2017] has expressed a similar, though distinct, critique). 
Taylor’s (2017b) response is as follows: 
In my view, there is no reason why an interpretation 
or conception of spirit-force that is more laden with 
cultural and metaphysical constructs (such as a 
Christian or Jewish mystic’s concept of God) should 
be seen as less valuable than one that is apparently 
less constructed (such as the Lakota concept of 
wakan-tanka or the Ainu of Japan’s concept of 
ramut). (pp. 117-118) 
The problem here is that in psychology, as in any other 
scholarly or scientific discipline, accuracy is valued. If 
one description is more encumbered with cultural and 
metaphysical constructs than another, then it will be 
valued less—and thus a hierarchy is established. The 
fact that Taylor’s view may differ does not alter this 
pragmatic reality.
 Furthermore, Taylor (2017c) has presented 
his work as reflecting not only a full evidence-based 
accounting of the source of spiritual experiences, but as 
documenting the beginning of a collective evolutionary 
leap forward into “a bright, new world of wakefulness” 
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(p. 267). This is one of the hallmarks of New Age religion 
(Hanegraaf, 2009), an approach also marked by
systems of belief and practice that include holism 
and interconnectedness, a unified worldview, a 
universalized spirituality based on appropriation 
and recontextualization of content from spiritual 
traditions, an evolutionary perspective, a blurring 
of psychology and spirituality, a focus on subjective 
experience, a mystical idea of the inner self, and a 
belief in the imminent dawning of a new and better 
era of human existence. (Hartelius, 2017b, p. 132)
Taylor’s (2016) soft perennialism checks nearly all of 
these boxes, and to call it a New Age religion is fitting 
and reasonable. 
 What I have suggested is that it is unfortunate 
for the reading public when scholars such as Taylor 
advance these sorts of metaphysical visions—in this case 
a version of New Age spirituality—under the guise of 
psychology, rather than as the spiritual teachings that 
they could more properly be considered. In response 
to this, Taylor (2017b) noted that “the soft perennialist 
model is not presented in this book, nor in any other of 
my popular books” (p. 113). This is not entirely accurate. 
In his most recent book, Taylor (2017c) has presented 
himself as a psychologist who studies awakening 
experiences. Thereafter, he referred numerous times to 
what is in one place termed “high-intensity awakening 
experiences in which one perceives a radiant spirit-force 
pervading all things and bringing all things into oneness 
as manifestations of the force” (p. 155). He also reviewed 
various religions for evidence that their teachings, if 
understood and described correctly, align with his view. 
While he did not use the term, soft perennialism, he 
has clearly presented its constituent elements, which 
makes his denial puzzling. This type of popular book, 
by someone with an advanced degree, does not reconcile 
science and spirit—it conflates religion with psychology. 
Conclusion 
The critique of Taylor's soft perennialism, and the opinion that this type of approach is unlikely to 
constitute the future of transpersonal psychology, 
is not offered lightly nor offhandedly. It is based on 
sober assessment after an extended consideration of 
the transpersonal field. For the past 15 years I have 
participated in an intensive study of the definition of 
transpersonal psychology (Hartelius, Caplan, & Rardin, 
2007), its scope (Friedman & Hartelius, 2013), its 
philosophy (e.g., Hartelius & Ferrer, 2013), its character 
(Hartelius, 2014a, 2016b), its relationship to evidence 
(Hartelius, 2014b), and its future (Hartelius, Krippner, 
& Thouin-Savard, 2017). As part of that process, I have 
observed the field shift from a significant commitment to 
Wilber’s (e.g., 2000) perennialist model to philosophical 
contexts that are far less reliant on overt metaphysical 
claims, a move that positions the field to engage with 
and influence the field of psychology rather than holding 
itself separate as a modestly elite spiritual community. 
Among the students I have encountered in ten years of 
graduate education, I have seen a shift toward greater 
interest in empirical data and research. On these bases, 
it is my considered opinion that perennialist models are 
more in the field’s past than its future, and that further 
investment of time and effort into such models would 
be better spent elsewhere. 
 At the same time, the transpersonal field 
maintains a somewhat experimental character. The 
fact that multiple attempts at perennialist models have 
been made and effectively critiqued helps to remove 
any residual doubt about perennialism as a possible 
vehicle for the psychology of spirituality. From my 
perspective, Taylor’s efforts and this dialogue may be 
constructive in rounding out the consideration of 
perennialism so the field can move forward toward 
the construction of a whole person psychology and a 
whole person neuroscience without wistful backward 
glances. The field will certainly continue to engage with 
philosophical questions, the hermeneutical value of 
metaphysical systems, and theoretical engagement with 
issues that cross over between psychology and religious 
studies—and will no doubt also move forward in some 
unexpected ways—but it is my hope to also see an 
emerging emphasis on empirical research.
 Taylor (2017a) has voiced concern regarding the 
tenor of my response to his work, in the process quoting 
from a transpersonal scholar who has made a statement 
regarding the spiritual values of the field. What Taylor 
and the cited scholar seem to miss is that if transpersonal 
psychology is a psychology at all, and not a New Age 
spiritual community posing as a psychology, then 
scholarly work deserves to be critiqued in a scholarly 
manner—that is, without pulling punches on the merit 
of the thought and methods, and without ad hominem 
attacks on the person. The focus here is not spiritual 
values, but scholarly values. 
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 With respect to Taylor's (2017b) call for maximal 
inclusiveness within the transpersonal field, it can be 
noted that his thought has been generously afforded more 
journal pages and more thoughtful and detailed response 
than any other submitting author during my tenure with 
this journal. I have stepped down from the position of 
editor on this issue in order to enter this dialogue on 
level ground, and turned over decisions regarding the 
publication of this set of papers to others; Taylor has been 
offered the last word in the current exchange, and a future 
issue will be opened to contributions by other scholars 
who wish to participate in what will likely be an ongoing 
conversation. Inclusivity does not require agreement, and 
academic journals have a role in upholding standards 
of scholarship within a given field as well as providing 
platforms for diversity of perspective. With respect 
to Taylor's (2016) work, the goal has been to balance 
inclusiveness with appropriate rigor; others can determine 
whether this has been achieved.  
 While I have critiqued his metaphysical schema, 
his claims of evidence, and his application of research 
methods, I have also warmly supported and encouraged 
Taylor's research into the phenomenon he has termed 
awakening experiences, noting repeatedly the great 
importance and potential of this subject for transpersonal 
psychology, as well as for psychology more broadly. Taken 
together, the critique and the encouragement is offered 
as guidance on where I believe Taylor could make the 
greatest contribution. 
 At the end of this writing I must acknowledge 
that a number of Taylor’s specific points and concerns have 
not been addressed. For this I offer my apologies, having 
chosen to focus on those aspects that seemed to me to be 
most relevant to the conversation, while also attempting 
to respond to the greater portion of his concerns. It is 
my sincere hope that with these latest two responses, the 
substance of the critiques and encouragements I have 
expressed will fall on fertile ground, and that Taylor will 
be able in future to contribute enhanced research on his 
topic. This would be of great benefit to the transpersonal 
field.
 It also seems appropriate to ask why this 
seemingly arcane topic is worthy of multiple papers. A 
Western pschology is limited by its culturally located 
philosophical assumptions. In order to more fully serve 
diverse individuals and cultures in an increasingly 
interconnected world, these limited assumptions need 
to be identified and critiqued effectively. The history of 
psychology is littered with challenges to these that failed. 
 For example, in the early 20th century Gestalt 
psychology offered a perspective on systems and holism 
that questioned particle-based views of mind and 
brain; today, the optical illusions used to illustrate its 
philosophical challenge appear in psychology textbooks 
under the topic of perception, stripped of reference to 
the movement and the conceptual openings it offered. 
Around the same time, phenomenology developed 
as a counterpoint to naive assumptions regarding 
the relationship between observer and observed, 
assumptions that largely survive within contemporary 
sciences including psychology; today its most common 
functions are analysis of consumer opinions about 
commercial products, and synthesis of peer feedback for 
corporate leaders, with some use as adjunct enrichment 
to quantitative data in psychology and sociology. In 
the mid-20th century humanistic psychology emerged 
as a champion of basing psychological theory on the 
present moment of human relationship and experience; 
today, its place has been claimed by positive psychology, 
which though a contribution in its own right, is little 
more than an optimistic version of cognitive approaches 
that propagate rather than challenge culturally based 
assumptions. More recently, there is momentum within 
the study of mindfulness to reframe it as a metacognitive 
approach rather than a whole person shift in state of 
being. One by one, approaches that could have shaken 
the foundations of psychology have been relegated to its 
margins, as the uncritical imposition of conventional 
assumptive frames stripped away articulate challenges to 
those very lenses. 
 In this context, transpersonal psychology is 
one of the very few orientations currently capable of 
mounting the sort of challenge urgently needed as a 
corrective for contemporary psychology, spanning all the 
way from philosophy, through theory and constructs, 
down to empirical evidence. If a transpersonal psychology 
spends its credibility on the uncritical adoption of 
perennialist models that can with some justification be 
framed as “openly religionist” (Hanegraaff, 2009, p. 51), 
it will forfeit any standing as a scientific field capable 
of bringing constructive challenge to the broader field 
of psychology. If a transpersonal psychology does not 
engage in this crucial work, which other subfield will 
step up to take it on in its place? Likely, none. 
 In a postmodern world it is not possible to 
say that science is a more true knowledge frame than 
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any other; science is one location among many, with 
its own strengths, characteristics, and limitations. 
It is, however, a useful location, and psychology 
functions within this terrain. Transpersonal critiques of 
psychology follow along the lines of feminist critiques 
of science more broadly, and both appear to serve a goal 
of improving science rather than undercutting it. To 
offer views that are arguably religious as if they were 
psychological theories—even psychological theories of 
spirituality—is to mistake one’s location. Location is 
a variable that matters. A comedian who earns large 
fees by ridiculing and insulting others on stage would 
not be well served to maintain this behavior in front 
of a judge or magistrate; similarly, the sort of legalistic 
hairsplitting that may win the day in a court of law is 
unlikely to help achieve resolution in quarrels with a 
domestic partner. Religious views are not wrong, nor 
are they objectively lesser than scientific ones; they are 
simply not suited for the domain of scientific work. 
Taylor’s work, as Wilber’s before him, likely belongs 
in the domain of inspiring popular spirituality or 
philosophy; not even a transpersonal approach should 
accept it as psychological theory. 
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